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Footnotes
1. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2011). Twenty-seven
states have adopted the language of Rule 2.3 or substantially sim-
ilar language. 
Over the past three decades, court leaders across thecountry have taken aggressive steps to confront racialbias in the courts. Recent efforts include in-depth
judicial education and training about how an individual’s
unconscious attitudes (including culturally learned associa-
tions or generalizations that we tend to think of as stereo-
types) introduce unjustified assumptions about other people
and related evidence that can distort a person’s judgment and
behavior. This phenomenon is now referred to as implicit bias
to differentiate it from explicit or intentional bias. Judicial-
education programs focus on raising judicial awareness about
implicit bias and introducing techniques that judges may use
to help minimize the impact of implicit bias on judicial deci-
sion making. 
Despite high levels of interest and genuine commitment to
racial fairness in the justice system, disparate treatment of racial
minorities persists and pervades all stages of the criminal jus-
tice process. Jury trials are a particularly troubling component
of the justice system with regard to the potential for racial bias.
Courts have extremely limited opportunities to educate jurors
about the pernicious effects of complex psychological phenom-
ena like implicit bias and how these implicit forms of bias may
distort jurors’ interpretation of trial evidence. Jurors are ran-
domly selected from the local community. Other than statutory
qualifications such as U.S. citizenship, age (adults 18 or older),
and the ability to speak and understand English, state courts
have no educational, occupational, or personal experience
requirements to be eligible for jury service. Most jurors in this
country serve only for the duration of the trial (typically two to
three days) and then are released from service. No time is avail-
able during this short period to provide the type of in-depth
education on implicit bias that judges and court staff may
receive. Instead, judges and lawyers are increasingly looking to
existing opportunities within the jury-selection and trial period
(e.g., juror orientation, voir dire, jury instructions) in which to
inform jurors about the propensity of implicit bias to affect
decision making and to provide concrete strategies to minimize
the impact of implicit bias on jury verdicts.
This article focuses on several of these interventions and the
factors that may increase or undermine their effectiveness. Most
Americans are aware of the existence of explicit bias and its
effects on decision making generally, but implicit bias is still a
relatively new concept about which many people in the justice
system are unaware. The first section of this article discusses
the difference between explicit bias and implicit bias and why
contemporary researchers have become more convinced that
much of the disparity in legal outcomes for African-Americans
compared to whites is likely due to implicit bias. We then
describe different interventions that have been proposed to
reduce the impact of implicit bias, and findings from empirical
research about their effectiveness. One complication of these
interventions is that some otherwise well-intentioned
approaches can provoke a backlash effect in which the individ-
uals exposed to the intervention are actually more likely to
make judgments or behave in ways that manifest prejudice. In
the context of administering these interventions with trial
jurors, there are a number of pros and cons, many of which
involve purely logistical concerns. We conclude with an update
about interventions that are currently being tried, including a
pilot test of an implicit-bias jury instruction. 
THE IMPACT OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Judges, lawyers, and court staff have long recognized that
explicit, or consciously endorsed, racial prejudices have no
place in the American justice system. The Code of Judicial Con-
duct in most states expressly prohibits judges from engaging in
bias, prejudice, or harassment on the basis of race, gender, eth-
nicity, or other factors, and the code even extends the prohibi-
tion to court employees over which the judges have control and
to lawyers appearing in cases before them.1 In fact, most judi-
cial-performance evaluations include measures of judicial
impartiality as a major focus. The underlying justification for
this prohibition is that discriminatory speech or behavior
undermines public perceptions of judicial impartiality and
competence. In contemporary society, most people recognize
that explicit racial bias is normatively bad, and they make
efforts to suppress biased behaviors or speech, even if they con-
sciously recognize that they have those attitudes. 
What often surprises members of the court community and
other professionals is that more subtle biases or prejudices can
operate automatically, without awareness, intent, or conscious
control. Personal attitudes and acquired knowledge often help
individuals function more efficiently by making it easier for the
brain to recognize and respond quickly to new people or situa-
tions. But some attitudes, especially racial and cultural stereo-
types, distort decision making by unfairly influencing judg-
ments about others. Although explicit or consciously endorsed
racial prejudices in contemporary American society may be on
the decline, this subtler form of implicit racial bias persists.
Over the past few decades, a number of specialized tests have
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been developed to help researchers identify, measure, and study
implicit forms of bias. One of the most popular is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), developed by researchers in the mid-
1990s at Yale University and the University of Washington. The
IAT operates under a basic premise of human cognition that
when an idea is consistent with a person’s attitudes or cultural
understanding, he or she will be able to mentally associate con-
cepts related to that idea more quickly and easily than if the
idea is inconsistent with a person’s attitudes or cultural under-
standing. In an early version of the IAT, for example,
researchers measured the amount of time it took people to asso-
ciate pictures or words representing flowers or insects with pos-
itive attributes (“good”) and with negative attributes (“bad”) by
hitting right or left keys on a computer keyboard. Because flow-
ers are generally viewed as intrinsically good and insects as
intrinsically bad (or at least significantly less good), most were
able to hit the keys associating flowers and words indicating
positive attributes, and insects and words indicating negative
attributes, much faster and with fewer errors than when they
asked to associate flowers with words indicating negative attrib-
utes or insects and words indicating positive attributes.2 The
difference in the amount of time and the number of errors
reflects the strength of the person’s preference for flowers over
insects. Interestingly, young boys and entomologists tended to
show weaker preferences for flowers over insects compared to
young girls and people who do not study insects professionally.3
This pattern of stronger preferences for more culturally familiar
and socially and individually learned concepts has been found
to be consistent for IAT tests measuring implicit biases based on
race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, religion, disabil-
ity, body weight, and other characteristics developed and
employed over the past 15 years. To try an Implicit Association
Test, go to www.implicit.harvard.edu. 
A large body of empirical literature now documents the exis-
tence of implicit biases and their behavioral implications. One
recent meta-analysis of 122 research reports found implicit
biases to be valuable, independent predictors of social behavior
and judgment.4 Implicit racial bias is the most studied type of
implicit bias. Research shows that implicit racial bias can pre-
dict the quality of social interactions and decision-making out-
comes in a variety of contexts, including voting, hiring, perfor-
mance assessment, budget setting, policing, and medical treat-
ment.5 In the context of the American justice system,
researchers now point to linkages between implicit racial bias
and disparities in detention
decisions, jury verdicts, capital
punishment, and other sen-
tencing outcomes.6
Research on judicial deci-
sion making suggests that
judges are affected by implicit
bias in ways similar to the gen-
eral population. In one study of
actual trial judges in three jurisdictions, white judges showed
strong implicit attitudes favoring whites over blacks (consistent
with studies of implicit bias in the general population).7 The
judges were presented with three vignettes, two of which did
not identify the defendant’s race but some of which included
words designed to trigger an association with African-Ameri-
cans (e.g., Harlem, dreadlocks). The third vignette explicitly
identified the defendant as white or black. The judges were
asked to recommend a judgment on guilt, to share their confi-
dence in that judgment, and to predict the defendant’s likeli-
hood of future recidivism. Interestingly, judges did not differ in
their judgments in the first two vignettes based solely on
whether the vignette included cues regarding race, but the
judges’ Race IAT was a marginally significant predictor of the
harshness of the sentence. Judges whose Race IAT indicated a
preference for whites over blacks were more likely to convict
the defendant, had greater confidence in that judgment, and
believed the likelihood of recidivism to be higher than judges
whose Race IAT indicated a preference for blacks over whites.
In the third vignette, judges with greater implicit bias against
blacks convicted black defendants at the same rate as white
defendants, but judges with greater implicit bias in favor of
blacks convicted black defendants less frequently than they did
white defendants. 
Studies of juror decision making also demonstrate the
impact of implicit bias on judgments. Levinson and Young, for
example, conducted a mock-jury experiment in which mock
jurors studied 20 pieces of trial evidence including photographs
of a crime scene, one of which was a surveillance camera pho-
tograph featuring a masked gunman whose hand and forearm
were visible. Half the cases showed light skin on the gunman
and half showed dark skin.8 This subtle manipulation of skin
color produced significantly different results in jurors’ confi-
dence in their verdict. On a scale of 1 (not at all guilty) to 100
(absolutely guilty), jurors who viewed the dark-skinned gun-
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man’s photograph rated the
defendant’s guilt at 66.97 on
average compared to 56.37 for
jurors who viewed the light-
skinned gunman’s photograph,
suggesting that skin color
affected how jurors perceived
and interpreted the trial evi-
dence. Other measures of
explicit racial bias were unre-
lated to study findings. 
Eberhardt and colleagues
investigated the extent to
which capital felony defen-
dants with stereotypically
black facial features are more
likely to be sentenced to death
than defendants without such features.9 Using a database of
death-eligible cases in Philadelphia that advanced to the
penalty phase between 1979 and 1999, the researchers identi-
fied 44 cases in which a black defendant was convicted of mur-
dering a white victim. They then obtained photographs of these
defendants and had neutral observers rate each defendant’s
looks on a scale of 1 (not at all stereotypically black) through
11 (extremely stereotypical). After controlling for nonracial fac-
tors known to influence sentencing,10 they found that defen-
dants who were rated as having less stereotypically black fea-
tures were sentenced to death in 24.4% of the cases whereas
defendants who were rated as appearing more stereotypically
black were sentenced to death in 57.5% of the cases. These find-
ings are consistent with previous research that people associate
black physical traits with criminality.
Employing the same methodology, Eberhardt and colleagues
also examined death-penalty rates in cases in which a black
defendant was convicted of murdering a black victim, but they
found no significant difference based on stereotypically black
appearances. Noting that juries may view black-on-white
crimes as intergroup conflict, rather than interpersonal conflict
involved in black-on-black crimes, they concluded that juries
may use physical appearance as a powerful cue to in determin-
ing whether a defendant deserves to die.
These studies and others11 demonstrate that racial biases in
legal decision making often arise in ways not easily or consis-
tently explained by traditional factors such as trial participant
demographic characteristics. In the discrete area of juror deci-
sion making, there is little evidence to suggest a straightfor-
ward, simple relationship between defendant race and juror
verdict preferences. Mock-juror studies such as the ones dis-
cussed here show some evidence of in-group biases,12 but stud-
ies that focus on the decision making of actual jurors in actual
trials find that the relationship between juror and defendant
race accounted for only a very small amount of the variance in
jury verdicts. Strength of evidence is generally the overwhelm-
ing predictor. Garvey and colleagues, for example, examined
decision making by more than 3,000 jurors in nearly 400 non-
capital felony trials in four jurisdictions.13 Only in the D.C.
Superior Court did the defendant’s race affect juror’s first votes
during deliberations, but even this relationship did not survive
into the juries’ final verdicts. Strength of the evidence, includ-
ing the credibility of police testimony, was the strongest factor
related to final verdicts.14
Similarly, Visher conducted 90-minute in-person interviews
with 331 jurors from 38 forcible-sexual-assault trials to exam-
ine the effects of juror characteristics, defendant and victim
characteristics, and evidentiary factors on juror decision mak-
ing.15 She found that juror characteristics accounted for only
2% of the variance in jury verdicts, and defendant and victim
characteristics accounted for only 8% of the variance. In con-
trast, evidentiary factors, especially the use of force and physi-
cal evidence, accounted for 34% of the variance. These findings
point away from strict demographic explanations for racial dis-
parities in legal decision making and toward a more complex,
nuanced alternative: one that explores how the decision maker’s
attitudes and cognitive schemas inform the perception and
interpretation of a host of evidentiary factors critical to fair legal
judgment.
PROMISING STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING IMPLICIT
BIAS
Social scientists have made great strides in recent years to
identify effective (and ineffective) interventions for combating
more insidious forms of racial bias. To reduce the effects of
implicit forms of bias in judgment and behavior, several inter-
ventions have shown promise. We discuss a few of these in turn.
EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS 
In general, basic education about the existence of implicit
forms of bias and how these can manifest in judgment is an
important first step. Personal awareness of one’s own potential
for any type of cognitive bias is necessary before an individual
is capable of engaging in efforts to correct for it. Although sim-
ply being aware of the potential for racial bias may prompt
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some individuals to pursue corrective action, it is not sufficient
to ensure that debiasing efforts consistently reduce or prevent
expressions of implicit bias.16 Individuals must understand the
nature of implicit bias—what it is and how it can affect judg-
ment—to increase the likelihood that the corrective efforts they
engage in are effective.17 And they must also possess the moti-
vation to fully implement such debiasing efforts. 
In framing an educational message on implicit bias, how-
ever, the appeal used has important ramifications. For example,
one set of studies has shown that some types of individuals are
angered and feel threatened by external pressure to comply
with mandatory nondiscrimination standards. 18 When away
from the watchful eye of the authority figure setting the stan-
dards for compliance, these individuals are more likely to
engage in biased decision making, presumably in attempts to
“reassert their personal freedom.”19 Thus if an authority designs
the educational message to pressure individuals to comply with
social or institutional standards for racial fairness, this extrinsic
motivation to regulate prejudice can incite hostility and gener-
ate backlash that may increase expressions of racial prejudice.
Legault and colleagues showed that exposing individuals to
educational messages designed to compel adherence to racial
fairness generated more explicit prejudice (in the form of self-
reported racial attitudes) and implicit prejudice (in the form of
reaction time measures like the IAT) than a no-intervention
alternative. That approach shows that forced-compliance inter-
ventions can actually increase expressions of prejudice over
doing nothing.20 In contrast, Legault and colleagues also found
that educational messages designed to inform and appeal to
personal standards for egalitarianism (i.e., to generate intrinsic
motivation to regulate prejudice) reduced expressions of
explicit and implicit prejudice compared to the no-intervention
alternative. Thus interventions designed to educate individuals
in an effort to encourage buy-in at a personal level and appeal
to these personal egalitarian standards are more likely to reduce
expressions of prejudice and avoid harmful backfire effects than
programs in which authorities force individuals to comply with
external anti-prejudice standards.
In addition, the effectiveness of an educational intervention
can depend on the ideology underlying the approach. The tra-
ditional institutional approach to racial fairness, referred to in
relevant literature as the color-
blindness approach, explicitly
directs individuals to ignore race
and other differences. This popular
colorblindness strategy underlies
the mandate that judicial decision
makers disregard extralegal factors
like race and gender when weigh-
ing the evidence. Given the
mounting evidence that messages
using intrinsic appeals are more
effective at reducing prejudice than messages conveying an
external pressure to comply, the colorblindness approach is not
an optimal bias-reduction strategy. This approach has been
shown to generate greater individual expressions of racial bias
on both explicit and implicit measures compared to a multicul-
turalism approach that promotes the value of diversity and
encourages individuals to appreciate group differences.21 In
addition to other research showing that a colorblindness
approach to reducing expressions of racial prejudice often back-
fires,22 a multiculturalism approach has been shown to improve
the likelihood that a person will accurately detect instances of
racial discrimination when observed, whereas a colorblindness
approach produces a reduced likelihood of detection. This
trend suggests that the colorblindness approach may appear to
work to improve racial fairness but in actuality may result in an
underreporting of incidents of racial discrimination.23
The counterproductive effects of particular strategies in the
promotion of racial fairness can spread beyond individuals in
the immediate educational environment. The mainstream pop-
ularity of the colorblindness approach can prompt white indi-
viduals, in response to implied (but unspoken) social cues to
ignore race, to spontaneously adopt a colorblindness strategy to
avoid the appearance of racial bias when interacting with a
black partner. Strategic demands to ignore race as part of a col-
orblindness approach to reducing racial prejudice can produce
unintentional, “ironic” effects: One study showed that as white
individuals devoted mental resources to the task of ignoring
race, they had fewer resources available to dedicate toward
monitoring and controlling their nonverbal behavior in social
interactions with black partners. As a result of this cognitive
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resource strain, white participants
actually exhibited less friendly non-
verbal behavior toward the black part-
ner than was observed when white
participants interacted with a white
partner.24 Other research indicates
that this kind of discriminatory non-
verbal behavior can negatively influ-
ence the subsequent perceptions and
responses of the stigmatized individ-
ual or individuals25 and may hinder
future efforts to engage in interracial interaction.26
Thus, educational initiatives promoting racial fairness
should focus not just on the individual, but also on the climate
of the organization as a whole. When peers and leadership fig-
ures demonstrate behavior consistent with the multiculturalism
approach, these expressions of egalitarian goals and beliefs will
positively influence others in the community.27 Other educa-
tional efforts to change racial attitudes through diversity-train-
ing courses have also helped to at least temporarily reduce indi-
viduals’ expressions of implicit and explicit racial biases.28
CONTACT AND EXPOSURE INTERVENTIONS 
Generally, increased interracial contact seems to have a pos-
itive effect on both implicit and explicit attitudes.29 Exposure to
individuals who contradict prevailing cultural or social stereo-
types can, in particular, reduce the expression of implicit racial
biases. This works when people have an opportunity to see or
interact with stigmatized group members in respected leader-
ship roles or as role models, or otherwise observe them behav-
ing in a manner that contradicts prevailing social stereotypes.30
Simply imagining stigmatized group members in counter-
stereotypic ways can also reduce the expression of implicit
biases.31 Even individuals who engage in extensive practice
mentally countering or negating stereotypes appear to be able
to successfully reduce implicit biases based on those stereo-
types over time.32
More diverse juries tend to produce decisions less biased by
the defendant’s race, presumably because they force jurors to
engage with one another on an equal basis in deliberations and
to expressly confront different conclusions about the trial evi-
dence that were reached based on the jurors’ unique life expe-
riences and attitudes, including implicit biases.33 Although
more research is needed on the precise mechanisms by which
jury diversity affects juror decision making, it appears that the
presence of minorities on a jury not only brings more diverse
perspectives to the table, but it also increases white juror aware-
ness of race-related concerns in a way that stimulates a more
thorough and more factually accurate evaluation and discus-
sion of trial evidence. 
INTERVENTIONS THAT CLARIFY STANDARDS FOR
JUDGMENT
Discrimination tends to emerge more in ambiguous deci-
sion-making contexts than straightforward ones.34 White-
majority juries more often convict and recommend harsher sen-
tences for black defendants than white defendants when the
prosecution presents weak or ambiguous evidence against
them.35 Other studies show that mock jurors are more likely to
discriminate against black defendants than white defendants in
verdict and sentencing decisions when presented with mixed or
incriminating but inadmissible evidence.36 To check for poten-
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tial bias, a decision maker may look to determine if he or she
has reasonable justification for the decision based on legitimate
decision-making factors. However, this research shows that it is
difficult for decision makers to realize when their decisions are
influenced by race, ethnicity, gender, or other extraneous fac-
tors if other selective information can be used to support their
decision. 
People may not be able to identify and correct for bias in
ambiguous contexts because decision-making standards tend to
change to rationalize judgments that are actually influenced by
extraneous factors. In a seminal series of studies, Uhlmann and
Cohen showed that when evaluating male and female job appli-
cants for a gender-stereotypical job (e.g., a stereotypically mas-
culine position as a police chief), people’s perceptions about the
credentials needed to be successful at the job tended to shift
post hoc to justify gendered decision making.37 That is, regard-
less of whether the male had “street smarts” or a strong educa-
tional background, people tended to justify their decision to
select the male candidate over the female candidate by claiming
that whichever credential the male had (but that the female did
not) was more important to the job. Most telling is the fact that
these decision makers thought they were providing an objec-
tive, rational, unbiased decision about the best candidate to
hire. 
If clear decision-making criteria are defined at the outset,
however, the type of “shifting standards” effect that can unin-
tentionally result in discrimination may be eliminated. In a fol-
low-up study by Uhlmann and Cohen, people who committed
to clear priorities about the criteria they would use in making
the police-chief hiring decision showed no evidence of gen-
dered decision making, but people who did not make such a
commitment and relied more on discretionary, selective justifi-
cation made decisions that were biased by gender. This shows
that clarified decision-making standards can reduce stereotyp-
ing and discrimination in outcomes. 
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION 
STRATEGIES FOR USE WITH JURIES
Although interventions have shown promise in reducing the
effects of implicit bias on judgment and behavior more gener-
ally, not all of these strategies lend themselves well to practical
application in jury decision making. We discuss some potential
intervention strategies for use with juries below and consider
the feasibility of each. 
EDUCATE JURORS ON IMPLICIT BIAS 
Education or training on the topic of implicit bias has been
provided to judges and court staff in some states.38 However,
even the most conservative of
these educational initiatives
take a significant amount of
time to implement and require
substantial resources and prepa-
ration. To introduce training
during jury selection, courts
would need to have trainers
available to present educational
material to prospective jurors,
the time to implement a semi-
nar that would likely last one to
two hours at minimum due to
the complexity of the subject
matter, and the resources to allow prospective jurors to explore
the topic through feedback or the opportunity for practice.
Moreover, most Americans now live in jurisdictions that
employ a one-day/one-trial term of service.39 This system sub-
stantially reduces the burden of jury service on individual
jurors by distributing it across a much larger pool of prospec-
tive jurors. Courts that have implemented this system necessar-
ily had to abandon the earlier practice of summoning prospec-
tive jurors for an “Orientation Day” and now conduct a brief
juror orientation (typically 20-30 minutes) in the morning
when jurors report and before they are sent to courtrooms for
jury selection. The combination of resources required for an
educational program on implicit bias plus the lack of time in
which to present such a program makes it unlikely that any
court would pursue this intervention option. 
RAISE AWARENESS OF IMPLICIT BIAS WITH IATS OR
RACE-RELEVANT VOIR DIRE QUESTIONING
A number of alternative interventions have been suggested
for use in jury selection, but little is yet known about their effi-
cacy in reducing bias. For example, the administration of IATs to
jurors40 and the addition of race-relevant voir dire questioning41
have been proposed as means of raising juror awareness about
implicit bias and alerting jurors to its potential influence on their
decisions. Although such approaches may help to reduce
expressions of bias, these options are impractical in many courts
for many of the same reasons discussed with regard to the edu-
cational-seminar option above. Costs associated with these tech-
niques (e.g., printing and processing of questionnaires at a time
when states are facing new and significant budgetary challenges)
and limited existing court resources (e.g., computer access for
potential jurors to take the IAT, or trained staff to code and
process a paper-and-pencil version of the test) preclude these
options from consideration in many jurisdictions.
37. Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 34.
38. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS:
RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012); Pamela M. Casey, Roger K.
Warren, Fred L. Cheesman, & Jennifer K. Elek, Addressing Implicit
Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64 (2013).
39. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS,
THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A
COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007). Under a one-day/one-trial term of
service, prospective jurors report to the courthouse on the sum-
mons date. If a juror is sworn as a trial juror or alternate, he or she
serves for that trial and is released from further service at the com-
pletion of the trial. If a juror is not selected as a trial juror or alter-
nate, he or she is released at the end of the reporting day.
40. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of
Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012).
41. Regina A. Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas & Kerry Kawakami, The
Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the Court-
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(2011).
45. Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial
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Future Research, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 65 (2008).
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Meixner, Damage Anchors on Real Juries (Sept 20, 2011) available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.188386. 
47. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (2010); COUNCIL FOR
COURT EXCELLENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JURY PROJECT, JURIES FOR
THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYS-
TEMS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19-37 (1998); Kenneth J. Melilli, Bat-
son in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremp-
tory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996).
48. See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L.
Hannaford-Agor & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 2d ed. 2006).
The National Center for State
Courts’ State-of-the-States Sur-
vey of Jury System Improvement
Efforts further illustrates the lim-
ited viability of debiasing inter-
ventions during voir dire.42 In
nearly 12,000 jury trials, judges
and lawyers reported that they
spent two hours on average to
select a jury, a task that also
involves confirming jurors’ qual-
ifications and ability to serve for
the length of the trial and inves-
tigating each juror’s ability to be
fair and impartial if selected as a
trial juror. Most judges and lawyers would not embrace new
debiasing interventions during voir dire due to the additional
time involved. States also vary in the extent to which voir dire
is judge-dominated or attorney-dominated, but in either case,
voir dire is perhaps the most individualistic stage of the trial.
Judges have a great deal of discretion in how they conduct voir
dire and are protective of that discretion as a matter of judicial
independence. In a judge-dominated voir dire state, the likeli-
hood of training the entire trial bench on how to use debiasing
interventions effectively in all cases, and then ensuring that
they actually apply that training, is very remote. Doing so in a
lawyer-dominated voir dire state is even more remote given the
complete absence of a unified bar. For consistent use in the
majority of state courts, a realistic practical remedy for implicit
bias in juror decision making must be not only effective but also
expedient and economical.
ASSEMBLE DIVERSE JURIES
Convention assumes that deliberations among a demo-
graphically diverse group of jurors are more likely to facilitate a
thorough and fair evaluation of the evidence because different
perspectives are presumed to be represented in the discussion.
Moreover, as indicated above, research shows that when white
jurors expect to engage with a diverse jury, they tend to
approach deliberations in a way that promotes a more thorough
and factually accurate evaluation of the evidence.43
It is not always possible, however, to ensure a racially diverse
jury. This may be of particular concern in jurisdictions with rel-
atively homogeneous jury pools, which comprise the great
majority of state courts. For example, the jury-eligible popula-
tion of black/African-Americans comprises less than 10 percent
of the total jury-eligible population in more than three-quarters
of counties in the United States. Those counties encompass
more than half of the total U.S. population.44 Unfortunately,
even in more diverse communities, jury panels often fail to fully
reflect community demographic characteristics due to non-sys-
tematic exclusion of minorities from jury pools,45 reductions in
the size of trial juries,46 and the pervasive discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.47
STRENGTHEN THE JURY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The past two decades have seen a dramatic change in judges’
management of jury trials. The traditional view that juror
impartiality is best served when jurors maintain a strictly pas-
sive role has gradually given way to the view that jurors are
active learners and perform best when given commonplace
decision-making tools to better understand and remember trial
evidence. These tools include permitting jurors to take notes,
permitting jurors to submit written questions to witnesses, per-
mitting jurors to discuss the evidence before final deliberations,
instructing jurors on the basic elements of the law they will be
told to apply before the evidentiary portion of the trial, and pro-
viding jurors with written copies of jury instructions.48 Evalua-
tions of each of these innovations have shown that they are
effective decision-making aids in terms of improved compre-
hension of the evidence and law and increased retention of evi-
dence presented at trial. By emphasizing the importance of
juror comprehension of the evidence and law, these types of
tools provide jurors with a stronger framework for decision
making and lead to greater clarity about the basis for their col-
lective verdict, which theoretically should reduce the potential
for implicit bias to skew the verdict. No research has been con-
ducted to explicitly examine the relationship between these
jury-trial innovations and implicit bias. Although there is some
reason to believe these tools may be helpful for this purpose, it
is premature to conclude that these innovations will reduce the
impact of implicit bias on jury verdicts. The potential efficacy
of these tools as debiasing agents must be examined and
demonstrated empirically, through rigorous scientific research,
before courts are encouraged to use them as implicit-bias inter-
ventions. 
USE SPECIALIZED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON IMPLICIT
BIAS
Historically, courts have relied extensively on jury instruc-
tions to guide juror decision making because this approach is
relatively inexpensive, expedient, and easy to administer to
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each new jury. However, research studies have provided mixed
evidence of its utility in practice. On one hand, most studies
confirm that jurors take their responsibility to apply the law
provided by the trial judge seriously, spending up to one-quar-
ter of their deliberation time focused on jury instructions.49 On
the other hand, although most jurors in actual trials report that
they understand the law relatively well,50 research shows that
jurors have fairly low levels of comprehension regarding the
basic legal principles articulated in jury instructions.51 But
when Diamond and her colleagues observed actual jury delib-
erations in 50 civil trials, they found that nearly 80% of the
jurors’ comments about the instructions were accurate and
nearly half of the incorrect comments were ultimately corrected
during deliberations. This led Diamond and her colleagues to
surmise that jurors in actual trials might be “able to assist one
another in ways not captured on post-deliberation questions or
in studies of individual respondents.”52 The implication from
this research is that to understand the full impact that any jury
instruction (including a specialized implicit-bias jury instruc-
tion) may have on juror decision making, one should examine
it in a context in which group deliberations take place. 
It is not yet known whether a well-crafted jury instruction
could help to mitigate the effect of implicit racial bias in juror
decision making. Studies show that individuals can control the
behavioral expression of implicit biases in specific laboratory
contexts if provided with a concrete strategy for bias reduc-
tion.53 In addition, whether or not jurors are motivated to pro-
duce a fair and just outcome can determine whether debiasing
instructions are followed. However, pattern jury instructions
developed for use in state and federal jury trials rarely incorpo-
rate these characteristics, relying instead on the simple admo-
nition that jurors should not let “bias, sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision.”54 Moreover, jury
instructions tend to be written in an authoritarian legal style
that, in the context of implicit
bias, may ultimately prove coun-
terproductive by triggering a
backlash effect.55
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that members of the
court community are coming to
understand the general problem
posed by implicit bias and are
clamoring for readily available
solutions on which they can act.
As the court community has
become more knowledgeable
about implicit bias and more
aware of the potential for harm in judicial decision making,
judges and lawyers have expressed a great deal of interest in
extending intervention efforts to jurors through the develop-
ment of a specialized jury instruction on implicit bias. Judge
Mark Bennett of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Iowa, was the first trial judge known to have incorporated this
approach in jury trials.56 More recently, the Criminal Justice
Section of the American Bar Association has convened a com-
mittee to develop a toolbox of options intended to reduce the
impact of implicit bias in court proceedings, including a jury
instruction on implicit bias.57 The topic of implicit-bias instruc-
tions has also been a recurring theme on listserv discussions
among members of pattern jury instruction committees.58
Through these efforts and others, several versions of implicit-
bias jury instructions are now or will soon be available for use. 
Unfortunately, existing research suggests the possibility that
an implicit-bias jury instruction may produce a backlash effect
that actually exacerbates expressions of both implicit and
explicit bias. This effect may not be universal: Specialized
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implicit-bias jury instructions may successfully reduce expres-
sions of bias with some types of jurors but elicit backlash from
others. Consequently, to prevent the dissemination of harmful
jury instructions that produce backlash effects, we strongly rec-
ommend that new jury instructions be carefully evaluated using
rigorous empirical methods to determine their overall and dif-
ferential effectiveness before they are broadly promoted for use
in the courtroom. 
To begin this process, the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) is currently engaged in an effort to test the efficacy of
an implicit-bias jury instruction. With funding from the State
Justice Institute,59 the NCSC has undertaken a project to draft
a model jury instruction on implicit bias and, using mock-jury
methods with a vignette of a fictitious trial, to pilot test the
instruction to determine its effectiveness in minimizing the
impact of implicit bias in juror decision making. The results of
the pilot study, which should be available in late 2013, will help
inform the direction of future efforts to address implicit bias in
jury trials.
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